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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the
power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in
the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian
government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero
Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries
share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social,
and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of
and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, large-scale
narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak
state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcelypopulated areas. Important differences exist, however in the
nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the
government response to them and the nature of government
and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's
experience to Peru.
The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and
Colombian insurgents -often a linked phenomenon-- are in
many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in
Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar
variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the
security threat in Panama is not directed against the state,
there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the
government - as the case of the FARC and Sendero
Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural
to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological
component at play in driving the threat.
Nor is drug
cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and
Peru.
The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the
threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or
small towns where state presence is minimal. The central
lesson learned from Colombia is the need to defme and then
address the key problem of a "sovereignty gap," lack of a
legitimate state presence in many part of the country.
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Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the
national govermnent between 2002 and the presence is owed
to many factors, including an effective national strategy,
improvements in the armed forces and police, political will
on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buyin to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite
to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption
of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in
conflicted areas.
Control of territory and effective state
presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence
in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic
development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs.
Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially
in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority,
improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens,
and furthering development to wean communities away from
drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as
practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if
properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within
government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's
traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public
confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be
overcome if this effort is to be successful.
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INTRODUCTION

The death of the top military commander of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) alias
"Jorge Briceiio" aka "Mono Jojoy" on September 22, 2010
in a bombing raid conducted by the Colombian military
highlighted the progress that country has made in a decadelong effort to establish legitimate state authority throughout
its national territory. At the time of his death, Briceiio was
hunkered down in underground bunkers dug into the
mountains in the municipality of La Uribe, located in the socalled "Macarena" region of Meta Department, about
21 Okrn south of Bogota. Four of the six municipalities of the
Macarena region, along with a municipality in neighboring
Caqueta Department constituted the 42,000 square krn
demilitarized zone (zona de despeje) created in an agreement
between then-President Andres Pastrana and the FARC in
1998 to facilitate peace talks. This area of Colombia had
been a traditional FARC stronghold before 1998, but the
zona de despeje arrangement allowed the FARC near
sovereign control over the area for 28 months. The FARC
responded by turning it into a command and control center
for its national operations, for stationing thousand of its
fighters, as well as for industrial-scale coca production
during the 28-month period while the despeje agreement
remained in force.
In the wake of the failed peace process, which ground to a

halt in early 2002, the Colombia government initiated what
was to become an increasingly effective campaign to roll
back the power of the FARC and other illegally armed
groups in the country and in the process take control over
large areas of national territory where legitimate state
presence had been usurped or where it had never existed.
The government's eventual success in the Macarena region,
the heartland ofFARC military strength and a mainstay in its
cocaine-based economic support structure, resulted from
strategic and tactical decisions taken during President Alvaro
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Uribe's second term in office aimed at a sequenced approach
to the consolidation of state authority, starting with securing
territory by the military, followed by the establishment of a
police presence, the eradication of coca production, either
voluntary or forced, and the eventual rise of a legal
economy. The Macarena region in fact became the first test
case of this new strategy, manifested in the "Plan of Integral
Consolidation of the Macarena" (PCIM) launched by the
government of Colombia with support from the United
States and the Netherlands in August 2007. This sequenced
approach to security and development was subsequently
applied to other highly conflictive areas of Colombia, such
as the "Montes de Maria "highlands in Bolivar and Sucre
departments, in the southern part of the Department of
Tolima and in the Department ofNariii.o.
Efforts by the Colombian government have neutralized the
military capabilities of the FARC. Briceno and the remnants
of the once-powerful FARC fronts in the Macarena region
had been pushed deeply into the mountainous hinterland of
the area and limited to small-scale defensive operations
several years before his demise. This process was repeated
on a national scale. During the past decade, Colombia came
back from the brink of a national meltdown to the point
where its security is no longer threatened by insurgents,
paramilitaries, and criminal gangs - all fueled by the
narcotics industry. Colombia's progress since the launching
of the bilateral initiative with the United States known as
"Plan Colombia" in 2000 offers important lessons for other
states threatened by the forces that undermined legitimate
authority in Colombia.
More specifically, its integrated
approach to consolidating state control may in particular
serve as an important point of reference. While the
effectiveness of the PCIM in the Macarena and similar
efforts elsewhere in Colombia still require further
assessment, the strategic approach to security and
development they embody makes sense in the Colombian
case.
4

This essay will review the lessons learned from Colombia's
efforts at consolidating legitimate state control - specifically
the case of the PCIM - and their applicability to Peru, a
country once gravely threatened by violent insurgencies and
still marked by deep economic, social, and ethnic divisions
that could lead to future conflict, as well as the implications
for Panama's Darien Region. Both countries are affected by
narcotics production and trafficking and a history of very
weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcelypopulated areas.
Important differences exist, however, in
the nature of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso insurgencies,
and even more in the Darien Region, the government
response to them, and in the nature of government and
society in the two countries that will affect the applicability
of Colombia's experience to Peru or Panama. Nonetheless,
there is value in reviewing the key lessons from Colombia in
light of the future challenges faced by Peru, and perhaps
Panama.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE

Colombia's central weakness throughout its history has been
the inability of govermnent to exercise authority over much
of its national territory. (This analysis is derived from: Peter
DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman and Phillip McLean,

Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing
State: Lessons from Colombia, CSIS 2009.)
This
sovereignty gap had been a consistent factor in Colombia's
history, but it rose to prominence with the coca boom in the
1990s when insurgencies such as the F ARC and Army of
National Liberation (ELN) used ungoverned areas as a
staging ground for attacks against state presence in urban
areas- isolated military bases and police stations being
favorite targets. Drug production fueled the power of the
insurgents, as well as the paramilitary armies that took form
during the 1990s both as a counterweight to FARC influence
in many rural areas and to contest the insurgents for control
over coca production and drug trafficking. Colombia's
5

difficult geography, vast ungoverned spaces and the drug
industry all conspired against the traditionally weak
Colombian state. By the late 1990s, the insurgents were
capable of defeating the ineffective and demoralized
Colombian army in pitched battles at the battalion level,
while the Colombian National Police didn't stand a chance
against better armed and more numerous guerrilla units.
State authority imploded all over the country as the FARC
carried out a strategy of expanding its theatre of operations,
controlling strategic corridors allowing its different fronts to
link up and facilitate the movement of drugs, supplies and
weapons, and gradually encircling Bogota and other
principal cities.
Recovery from Colombia's precipitous slide towards
potential state failure began during the Pastrana
administration (1998-2002) when the Colombian army began
to be reorganized and increased in size. This process
accelerated during the first term in office of President Alvaro
Uribe (2002-2006). More importantly, Uribe and his
advisors developed a coherent counter-insurgency strategy
based on taking and holding territory, protecting local
populations, controlling key geographic corridors essential to
drug trafficking and supply and mobility for insurgents, and
demobilizing the paramilitary forces that in the end
threatened democracy and state authority as gravely as did
the FARC. This strategy - the "Democratic Security Policy"
very correctly identified the sovereignty gap as the central
problem in Colombia and the strengthening of legitimate
state control the key antidote. This policy was adjusted and
upgraded over time, but it essentially was executed during
the entire eight-year period of Uribe's presidency, with
continuation into the new administration of Juan Manuel
Santos (2010-).
To carry out his Democratic Security Policy, Uribe
understood that the size and capability of the armed forces
and police would have to be increased substantially, that it
6

needed far greater mobility, and that substantial amounts of
resources would have to be dedicated to this effort on a
sustained basis. Accordingly, spending on security rose
sharply during the first years of the Uribe administration,
funded in part by a special tax on Colombia's wealthiest
citizens and businesses and with support from the United
States. Between 2002 and 2009, Uribe increased the size of
the armed forces by 39 per cent and the police by a third.
As importantly, he increased the number of professional
soldiers in the army - the core counterinsurgency force - by
56 per cent during the same period, forming scores of new
brigade and battalion-sized units, many trained by the United
States under Plan Colombia assistance. A local home guard
force called soldados de mi pueblo ("hometown soldiers")
was stood up, organized in special platoons of 40 men and
based largely in rural towns in some 600 locations across the
country, largely to hold down territory, disrupt insurgent
supply corridors and demonstrate state presence, freeing up
more elite troops for combat missions.
In parallel, the Colombian National Police was vastly
expanded and strengthened. From 2002 to 2009, nearly 300
new police stations and sub-stations were established, mainly
in rural areas, and staffed with national police. The existing
force of rural police (carabineros) was expanded to some
7,400 strong, with special "mobile squadrons" of heavilyarmed units trained as light infantry created to patrol
particularly conflictive areas and to assist in narcotics
eradication.

A major effort was made to increase the mobility of the
Colombian armed forces and police, based on rotary airlift
capability. At the beginning of the Pastrana administration,
the armed forces had about 20 helicopters. By 2008,
Colombia operated the third largest fleet of Black Hawk (UH
60-L and AH 60L) helicopters in the world, with more than
70 units (as of2009) and a total helicopter fleet of nearly 200
in 2008. These assets gave the Colombian armed forces with
7

an enormous advantage in counter-insurgency operations in
mountainous and rural areas. Other aircraft, such as the
Embaer 314 "Super Tucano" light attack plane (the aircraft
used in the bombing raids against the FARC camps that
resulted in the deaths of top FARC leaders "RaUl Reyes" and
"Mono Jojoy") were added to the fleet.
Colombian counterinsurgency capabilities improved in many
other ways, often with U.S. support.
Training,
professionalization, intelligence capability, administration,
supply, maintenance of equipment, night operational
capability, NCO training, and human rights awareness were
all improved substantially.
With improvements in the size, capability, and strategy and
tactics of the armed forces and police, Colombia was able to
neutralize the FARC, virtually eliminate the ELN as a force,
bring about the demobilization of nearly 30,000 paramilitary
fighters, and substantially reduce the weight of the drug
economy as a factor affecting the country's security and
development. In the wake of the killing of Briceii.o/Mono
Jojoy, the FARC should be nearing the point in which it is
willing to consider peace talks. While criminal gangs
engaged in drug trafficking still put a serious strain on law
enforcement, they no longer pose a state security threat.
Colombia still faces serious challenges, including deeply
entrenched poverty, inequality, weak judicial systems, and
persistently high levels of crime, but the crisis stage has been
passed and the future of the country is more positive than
anyone could have hoped ten years ago.
In 2007, the Colombian goverrnnent, with U.S. support,
shifted gears in its effort to establish effective state presence

in areas formerly controlled by illegal armed groups. That
year, it undertook a new strategy for consolidating state
authority that was first applied in the Macarena region of
Meta department-- the PCIM. (For a mid-stream evaluation
of the effectiveness of PCIM, see: Peter DeShazo, Phillip
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McLean and Johanna Mendelson Forman, Colombia's Plan
de Consolidaci6n Integral de Ia Macarena An Assessment,
CSIS, June 2009). This was a sequenced approach by which
areas secured by the military - in this case the very effective
Task Force Omega of the Colombian armed forces - are
gradually turned over to police forces for law enforcement
and narcotics eradication. As areas become secure enough,
PCIM civilian employees enter the areas to engage local
populations in rounds of discussions on the kinds of projects
and activities most needed in each community to promote
economic and social development. These efforts are aimed
at producing letter-of-reference agreements between PCIM
development entities and local communities - in essence
obtaining "buy-in" from resident populations for the
individual development projects to be carried out. In the
case of the Macarena, local communities were most
concerned about the need for tertiary roads to get cash crops
to market, access to farm machinery and to credit, the need
for technical assistance to farmers, and land titling to
leverage credit and provide stability for rural communities.
To better coordinate civil-military efforts, PCIM established
a "fusion center" for each project, basically a small
headquarters operation on the ground in the zone itself, out
of which all elements of the PCIM operated.
The experience of PCIM and other such efforts in Colombia
is yet to be fully evaluated.
Certain conclusions can,
however, be drawn from the PCIM that are relevant
elsewhere.
The consolidation of effective security is
essential but the sooner military units can be replaced by
civilian police the better. At the same time, policing needs to
be community-based, with officers and agents reaching out
to the local communities to win their trust. Without effective
security, counter-drug initiatives and social and economic
development will not be possible. The PCIM experience
also underscored the need for a greater civilian role in the
consolidation of state presence. The military part - in the
case of Colombia- was important but buy-in to the model of
9

integral development from the Ministry of Defense has been
more enthusiastic than from other ministries, especially key
ones such as Agriculture or the social development agency
Accion Social. Civilian inputs at an early stage in the
process are necessary to enlist citizen support and
cooperation. This must be across the board - including
teachers, health workers, and support for incipient municipal
government, agricultural extension, judicial authorities, and
sources of credit.
In the case of PCIM, greater civilian resource support from

within the Colombian government was identified as the key
ingredient that would determine the success or failure of
integrated development efforts.
For that reason, the
establishment of a government coordinating body to
supervise efforts such as PCIM led by a figure reporting
directly to the president and with the authority to elicit and
obtain resources from the civilian ministries and agencies is
essential. As guerillas are pushed out of areas and state
authority is established, local residents need to see the value
of a state presence immediately in terms of improving their
lives. This is especially important if the cultivation of coca
is to be carried out on a sustained basis. Local farmers must
be convinced that government authority is permanent, that
there is no future in growing coca but also that viable
alternatives exist. Forced eradication with no follow-up in
terms of even short-term subsidies or cash payments for local
farmers will alienate them from the state.
The key lessons learned from Colombia's expenence
include:
• A Colombia-specific response was required to
address Colombia's crisis- not a formulaic approach.
• The root of Colombia's security crisis stemmed from
a weak state incapable of exercising legitimate state
authority and solution of the crisis needed to be based
on remediation of this phenomenon, including
10

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

undercutting the ability of non-state factors to use
force.
Illegal narcotics were not the root of the problem but
an exacerbating factor, creating an asymmetric
resource relationship between illegal armed groups
and the state.
Colombian efforts underscored the concept of
security as a public good. The focus on security and
the government's ability to exercise authority became
the key deliverable of the Uribe administration.
Progress in delivering state security generated strong
support for the government among the Colombian
people.
Colombia's counter-guerilla campaign never became
a war against its own people. Colombia's armed
forces did not engage in widespread human rights
violation but rather won popularity as a defender of
public security.
Colombia's security strategy from the start included
counter-drug and economic development aspects, but
these became more integrated and effective
components only over time. They were dependent on
the establishment of security as a precondition.
A successful security strategy required sustained
political will and resources. Colombian elites were
expected to pay the lion's share of the expense
through higher taxes.
As the internal conflict abated, efforts shifted from
the military to the law enforcement sphere, with
fewer troops and more police needed.
Police in Colombia are still in the necessary process
of adapting from the mentality of garrison forces to
co=unity-based police interfacing with the people.
Control of territory and effective state presence led to
a sharp reduction in crime and violence.
Government
control
over
territory,
key
transportation,
energy
and
co=unications
11

infrastructure has enhanced prospects for economic
development.
• The rule oflaw remains Colombia's weakest element
and the one requiring the most enhanced attention by
the gove=ent.
The future of effective and
sustained state control will depend on far more
gove=ent resources being dedicated to the rule of
law.
• Counter-drug efforts cannot be successful or
sustained without a legitimate state presence on the
ground.
• Counter-drug campaigns must be multi-faceted,
balancing eradication with the establishment of
security and development.
• If insurgents or drug gangs have the capability of
forcing or cajoling farmers into growing coca, the
chances for cultivation of legitimate crops will be
poor. Appeals to grow substitute crops when coca
remains an option are not effective.
• "Alternative development" initiatives to drugs are
likely to fail unless they are carried out in an
environment of reasonable state presence and control.
They must also be economically feasible.
APPLICABILITY OF LESSONS
EXPERIENCE IN PERU

FROM

THE

COLOMBIAN

Peru's experience with Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) differed
from Colombia's efforts against its own insurgencies in
several important ways. Furthermore, differences in the
nature of Peruvian and Colombian society have an important
bearing on the applicability of Colombia's efforts at
consolidating an integral development strategy. There are,
nonetheless, important similarities and useful points of
reference.
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The rise and fall of SL took place during a quite limited
period of time compared with the history of the FARC- still
ongoing - in Colombia, due to important differences
between the two insurgent groups. While both movements
were inspired by Marxism, the FARC paid far less attention
to ideology than SL, which became totally imbued with
revolutionary zeal.
While the FARC had a definite
hierarchy, its leadership was more dispersed than SL, which
had an undisputed leader who developed an extraordinary
cult of the personality around him. The collapse of SL with
the capture of Abirnael Guzman in 1992 has had no
replication in Colombia with the death of "Manuel
Marulanda" although the Colombian strategy of putting
extreme pressure on top FARC leadership is over time
bearing fruit and has greatly weakened that organization.
The ideological fanaticism of SL caused it to commit
incredible acts of savagery directed against local, often
indigenous populations in Peru, resulting in the alienation of
SL from most of society. For its part, the FARC also
committed widespread abuses and failed to gain popular
support, but was more pragmatic and patient in launching
attacks against the state. Because SL had a greater presence
in towns, with Guzman establishing his headquarters in
Lima, Sendero could be more easily dealt with by Peruvian
security forces than the FARC, which operated over a vast
area of territory. SL's larger size (perhaps 23,000 fighters at
peak compared with the FARC's peak order of battle
strength of about 17,000) was concentrated in a smaller
space, rendering it a more accessible target.
The Peruvian response to SL underscored in reverse some of
the lessons from Colombia. The terrible human rights
violations committed by the Peruvian army during the
Belafulde administration (1980-1985) in counter SL helped
fuel support for the insurgency, whereas Colombia's armed
forces never engaged in a war of terror against their own
citizens. The excellent relationship between the Colombian
armed forces and the civilian government - particularly
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during the Uribe administration - was clearly not the case
during the years of the Alan Garcia government (19851990), although Garcia did rein in the human rights abuses.
Colombia's long tradition of civilian control of the military
certainly set it apart from Peru in this regard.
Both
Colombia and Peru's armed forces were underfunded during
key periods when they faced a determined insurgency and
only improved as more resources became available,
including for salaries. Peru's army, however, was never
transformed into the professional counter-insurgency force
that Colombia's became.
Increased intelligence capability
played an especially important role in undermining both SL
and the FARC - above all in allowing for the capture or
killing of top leadership.
Lack of legitimate state authority played a large role in
encouraging illegal armed groups in both countries.
Colombia is moving more effectively to resolve that
problem. While the SL insurgency was largely crushed by
the mid-1990s, the state presence in many areas of Peru
remains weak - even in areas of relatively larger population,
especially in the heavily indigenous areas of the central and
southern Andes.
Although SL alienated indigenous
populations with its violence and fanaticism, the Peruvian
state did not profit much from this process. Widespread
distrust of the government remains in the highland areas of
the country where the SL insurgency was especially strong as evidenced by the large vote in those areas for the antisystem candidate Ollanta Humala in the 2006 presidential
election.
The defeat of SL was not followed by the
consolidation of an effective state presence in the highlands:
judicial authorities, police, and economic development.
Continued poverty and alienation remains a fact of life in the
highland and well as Amazon regions.
The violent
confrontation between police units and indigenous protestors
in the Amazon region town of Bagua in June 2009 which
resulted m several dozen deaths underscored the
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confrontational mentality and degree of alienation that exists
with regard to the state.
It is highly likely that in the April 2011 presidential
elections, indigenous voters in Peru will turn out in large
numbers to vote for a candidate who runs against the status
quo - like Humala in 2006. A possible scenario for Peru
would be a re-channeling of the frustration and violence
unleashed by SL along ethnic rather than class lines, with
important elements of the indigenous population turning
away from the national state.
Indigenous political
participation in Peru has traditionally been mobilized by
non-indigenous parties or movements, including the Marxist
left, reformist military elements, and radical populists, but
this is changing with the rise of indigenous-based
movements such as Peru Plurinacional. Indigenous people
in the Andes and Amazon have not substantially shared in
the benefits of Peru's rapidly expanding economy during the
past decade, which has exacerbated the already-great social
and economic disparity between Lima and the coast, on the
one hand, and the highlands on the other.

Peru's leadership can take away some important lessons
from Colombia and from that country's recent efforts to
promote integrated development.
One regards the
legitimacy and authority of the state, manifested in control of
territory but also in the presence of state institutions and
services that enlist the support of local citizens. While
expectations for improvements are high in Colombia and
frustration could set in if not attended to, there is already
alienation from the state in some heavily indigenous areas of
the state in Peru. The Peruvian government needs to make a
much larger effort to establish an effective police-based
security presence in these areas, but with strong community
ties.
Colombia has also demonstrated that without a legitimate
state security presence on the ground, effective counter-drug
15

activities, especially manual eradication, is ineffective.
Likewise, so-called "alternative development" projects
aimed at substituting other crops for coca will fail if the
cultivation and commercialization of coca remains an option.
However, the state must provide transitional resources,
subsidies, and services to communities involved in
eradication of coca, as well as longer-term inputs to activate
a sustainable legal economy. Enlisting the private sector and
civil society in this effort is also important.
The idea of the state coordinating its "integration" efforts in
conflict zones makes sense in Peru - at least in terms of
better coordination, both at the national and the local level
of the many state entities needed to improve security,
counter-drug efforts, economic development, governance,
and the delivery of social services. Presidential support for
such an initiative is essential, since the resources of many
different government entities must be eulisted - resources
that many of them would rather invest elsewhere unless
directed to do so from the top. While Peru's national
security is not threatened by an insurgency, it should
nonetheless look to the case of Colombia in terms of the
benefit of special taxes levied on those most able to pay and
specifically focused on certain key improvements- such as
strengthening the judiciary, rural infrastructure, health, and
education in areas of civil unrest or heavy coca cultivation.
Colombian society refused to deal with the terrible problems
affiicting the country until it was almost too late and still
must not be complacent, since substantial weaknesses remain
in terms of the rule of law, governance, and poverty. Peru
beat back the SL insurgency, but at a deep and lingering cost.
Despite its notable economic successes, Peru still faces many
of the institutional weaknesses of the past, but in a society
lacking the political consensus and public support for the
state that Colombia enjoys.
Peruvian leaders should take
note of the lessons from Colombia and redouble their own
efforts to strengthen legitimate state presence in areas where
16

it is weak and begin to reverse the confidence gap that
distances many citizens from their government.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DARIEN

The Darien region of Panama, including the Province of the
Darien and portions of the Cornarca of Kuna Y ala, have long
been affected by the activities of drug trafficking and the
presence of both FARC insurgents and paramilitary units
crossing the border from neighboring Colombia.
By all
indications, security concerns in the Darien caused by drugs
and the FARC have sharpened in recent years, the former a
reflection of an increase in drug trafficking out of the
Colombian Department of the Choc6, which borders the
Province of Darien, and the latter the result of successes by
the Colombian government against FARC fronts in the
Uraba region of Antioquia, causing F ARC units to seek
refuge in Panama.
The security threats to Panama from drug trafficking and
Colombian insurgents - often a linked phenomenon -- are in
many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in
Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar
variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the
security threat in Panama is not directed against the state,
there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the
government - as the case of the FARC and Sendero
Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural
to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological
component at play in driving the threat.
Nor is drug
cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and
Peru.
The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the
threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or
small towns where state presence is minimal. The security
threat to Panama is derived from the larger effects of drug
trafficking, threats to the safety and well-being of the largely
17

indigenous population of the Darien, concerns about
accelerated environmental degradation in the rich Darien
rainforest, and the potential that extra-state elements could
eventually control a piece of national territory in Panama.
These variables have regional and international implications,
including for the United States.
Colombia's response to the insurgent/drug threat is also
partially valid for Panama- mainly regarding the need for an
effective state presence in the Darien region. Panama has no
armed forces and it is therefore necessary to strengthen the
tactical units of the Servicio Nacional de Fronteras and the
National Police in Panama to provide a security presence
capable of dealing with well-armed insurgents and drug
traffickers.
The Darien is Panama's largest province but
with the smallest population - much of the province is
national park, and sectors of the Kuna Comarca are similarly
unpopulated, further complicating the task of establishing a
state presence. Panamanian authorities should look to
protect citizens and build their presence in small towns and
capacity to patrol rural areas. Other manifestations of the
state, such as courts, municipal government, teachers, and
health centers need to be expanded. As in Colombia, the
government of Panama must take measures to provide local
inhabitants with economic support, promote small-scale but
environmentally sustainable agriculture and pay special
attention to the needs of the Embera and Wounaan
indigenous co=unities. A major threat to the region is
deforestation, another key security concern for Panama,
especially if it results in the cultivation of coca leaf. In this
regard, preventing squatters from other areas in the country
from settling in the Darien should be a priority for
Panamanian authorities.
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